Living in a Low

Find this book:
Divided into three parts, concerning British government policies, case studies and speculative f iction, the very mixed group of authors in Living in a Low-Carbon Society in 2050 largely agree that major technological, social, economic and political undertakings are required to reduce carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions in Britain by eighty per cent by 2050. While there is broad agreement as to the economic and technical f easibility of this reduction, the authors also acknowledge climate change is not a reality f or all sectors of society and a low-carbon society remains a low priority f or many.
T he f irst part of the book relates to British government policy and politics and is arguably the best section in the book. By asking what a low carbon world might consist of and what it would mean to live well in a low-carbon British society, the book shows that a range of low carbon f utures are f easible depending on choices made by government, businesses, community groups and individuals. However, the authors f eel that British politicians lack the will needed f or serious policy changes, even though many of the pathways identif ied depend on policy makers managing the transition to a low carbon society. It seems politicians are loathe to f orce upon their voters a world without cars, planes, conventional agriculture, land rights, borders and f oreign holidays.
T he authors broadly of f er justif ication f or strong leadership with the book editor, Horace Herring, invoking Margaret T hatcher, as he demands strong government action and a radical Prime Minister to push through legislation to overcome hostile public attitudes, high carbon energy companies and a populist media. T here is little discussion of policies that seek to maximise the potential speedy dif f usion and deployment of clean technologies -policies that support open source innovation, investment and international cooperation. Meanwhile the question as to whether naïve interventionism will drive new inequalities or create new hierarchies is only partially answered.
T he book goes on to look at present day case-studies of low-carbon living. T hese relate to housing (converting, retrof itting homes), the possible changes of climate change on British agriculture and a chapter by Tanya Hawkes that argues f or environmental justice in the f orm of an "International Court of the Environment". T here are examples of individuals who f eel the need to "do something" by renovating their houses. However, the given example of triple glazed windows at £18,000 is hardly solution that cuts across economic, legal, economic, institutional, cultural, social and political barriers. T he cases in this chapter may have been better complemented with examples of successf ul low-carbon living such as Transition Towns or by addressing clean technology patent ownership issues that make climate-f riendly technologies unaf f ordable.
Part three of the book relates to speculative f iction, driven by f our mildly utopian to dystopian stories that don't really connect the preceding sections of actual designs and practices to f uture utopias and dystopias about living in low-carbon societies. T he weakest part of the book, the utopian and two dystopian stories, of f er speculations about the f uture that are equally unappealing (but perhaps this is the point). Rather than opening up and exploring interesting tensions in contrasting visions of the f uture (centralised versus decentralised power), the reader is lef t with images of robo-gunes, eugenic quests, a robo-butler, a child climate ref uge with extraordinary recall, a sausage f estival and a couple who use DigiT himble's, speculative f iction may be best lef t to the genre f rom which it originates and deserves to stay.
While the book's f ocus, rather than technical or economic f easibility, was instead to imagine what kind and sort of political and social changes would be needed to live in a low carbon world and thereby persuade its readers to transition to that world. However, various scenarios solutions and pathways f or doing so were not clearly laid out and became muddled over the course of the book. T he authors largely agree the means to achieve a low-carbon f uture is unappealing, and they seem to have little conf idence that British society will voluntarily chose to adapt to a world of restriction. T he f ocus is on drastic policy interventions to make carbon matter in people's lif estyle decisions and return Britain to a time bef ore rapid economic growth, population increases, chemical-intensive agriculture, and auto-mobility. T he imagined f utures do not seem to include f ree market policies or measures such as carbon trading, nuclear or (shale) gas, and theref ore, the 'risk' of doing nothing of ten seems more appealing than the pathways suggested.
Given their lack of f aith in people and politicians, there is a dystopian undercurrent in this book and a longing f or epoch-making events such as extreme weather, a drastic f all in incomes, societal collapse, and climate ref ugees, in hopes these events might shock people and politicians into drastic change. It seems the Deepwater Horizon oil spill wasn't enough, as Horace Herring points to the tsunami in Japan and the damaged Fukushima nuclear power plant as the pathway to af f ect nuclear policy and overcome media and popular hostility to change.
While the book is not as intensive nor authoritative as it claims, f or those thinking about moving to a lowcarbon world, it is heartf elt, sincere and a worthwhile read. Likewise, it may help to conf irm f or many that the f uture is increasing volatile, uncertain and unknowable. T his approach may encourage our societies and hopef ully our politicians to make better decisions when adapting to technological, institutional and behavioural changes brought about by climate change. 
